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Approved For Release 2005/07/20 : CIA-RDP79-00957A000100040064-6

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25X1

Journal - Office of Legislative Counsel
Monday - 29 July 1974

Page 2

25X1

8. [] Received a call from Dennis Neill, OGC/AID, concerning Senator Abourezk's amendment No. 1511 to S. 3394. Neill said the amendment is scheduled to begin markup next Monday and read me AID's Executive Branch position paper. The paper deals almost entirely with problems peculiar to AID, in particular the International Police Academy and does not adequately cover our problems. I told Neill that we would be soon sending our comments on the amendment directly to Senator J. W. Fulbright, Senate Foreign Relations Committee. Neill was delighted with this and asked that he be provided a copy of our letter for background purposes.

25X1

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and found it doesn't work much better. We can't afford strikes three. As long as men write laws, laws will be imperfect. If that weren't true, we would have legislated ourselves out of business long ago. We can only do our best, and then try to improve on it. We did our best with our postal reorganization plan. Now it is time to do better.

FOREIGN ASSISTANCE AND FOREIGN MILITARY SALES ACT

The SPEAKER pro tempore. Under a previous order of the House, the gentleman from Massachusetts (Mr. HARRINGTON) is recognized for 5 minutes.

Mr. HARRINGTON. Mr. Speaker, in the coming few weeks, the Foreign Affairs Committee will be meeting to amend the Foreign Assistance Act and the Foreign Military Sales Act. I anticipate offering a series of amendments to this legislation designed to fulfill two purposes. One group of amendments will deal with our policy toward Latin America—a policy which I believe to be in need of substantial change. The other group is designed to improve Congressional control over expenditures of foreign aid and military assistance moneys.

On May 7, I introduced legislation to repeal the provisions existing in our foreign aid laws prohibiting trade with Cuba. Similar legislation has been introduced by my colleague from Ohio (Mr. WHALEN). I expect to offer this bill as an amendment to the Foreign Assistance Act when the Foreign Affairs Committee considers it. I would like to take this opportunity to discuss the reasons our policy toward Cuba should be changed.

In recent years the United States has committed itself to creating an "era of negotiations" and has engaged in broad efforts to attain détente with the People's Republic of China and the Soviet Union—the leading Communist superpowers. While the United States has courted relations with the Communist giants, our attitude toward Cuba remains one of hostile neglect. I believe we should bring our policy toward Cuba up to date and in line with the general policy of this administration, that of international pluralism. The trade embargo of Cuba and nonrecognition of Castro's regime may have been reasonable and perhaps justifiable in the context of the last three decades, but as the ideological and political tensions of the cold war have given way to an atmosphere of global exchange and international cooperation, resumption of relations with Cuba should be viewed, it seems to me, as a diplomatic imperative.

The maintenance of a trade embargo is no longer justifiable. The embargo has failed in its original objective of coercing Castro by attempting to create economic chaos in Cuba and international isolation of the Castro regime. The embargo has also proven to be a liability in attempts to reach hemispheric unity as it is a constant source of conflict among OAS nations. Finally, this narrow-minded policy has prevented economic and cultural exchanges between Latin American nations and Cuba—exchanges which traditionally have been beneficial to all concerned. The embargo has cost us the friendship of the Cuban people

and we have lost access to the potentially valuable Cuban markets.

Some observers interpret the continued presence of Soviet military forces in Cuba as an indication of malevolence on the part of the Castro regime toward the United States. But it seems to me that the Russian presence has been forced upon the Cuban people by the insensitivity and hostility of the United States toward that nation. The Soviet military presence can be viewed as an understandable reaction on the part of the Castro government to what might be viewed as a potential threat from the United States. The abundance of Russian aid to the island economy has been made necessary because the United States has closed off traditional avenues of trade with Cuba and has restrained assistance from other nations. But the time is right for change. Both the Soviets and the Cubans appear to be tired of the economic dependency of Cuba on the Soviet Union. Thus, repeal of the embargo would ease international tensions between both the United States and Russia and the United States and Cuba. The repeal would be a welcome relief to the Soviets, to the Castro regime, and especially to the Cuban people.

The Cuban people are not our enemies. Regardless of Castro's politics and the ideological differences between governments, the peoples of the United States and Cuba have been traditionally friendly. It is time to renew this friendship. Instead of fulfilling its purpose to weaken Castro's domestic and international standing, the trade embargo has served only to inconvenience and harm the Cuban people through continued shortages of consumer goods, rationing of all essentials, the poor availability of necessary medical supplies. Moreover, we must acknowledge the fact that Castro appears to have the strong support of the majority of the citizenry of Cuba. Just as we have accepted the legitimacy of other Communist regimes, we must accept that we can no longer justify a policy toward Cuba which is indirectly at least founded on the premise of ending the Castro regime. Hence we must forsake the unproductive policy of long-term economic reprisal, and we must face the fact that the embargo instead of overthrowing Castro, may have strengthened him by enhancing popular support for his regime against the external threat posed by the policies of the United States. Resuming United States-Cuban trade would normalize the Cuban economy and ease the burden of development upon the Cuban people, hopefully earning their goodwill toward the United States and improving the whole of hemispheric relations.

It seems to me as the years pass that only the United States will remain isolated through a continuation of our current trade embargo. Seven Latin American nations have already ignored the OAS resolutions to end diplomatic and economic relations with Cuba. President Luis Echeverria of Mexico is currently traveling throughout Latin America to gain more support for a change of the OAS policy. Even Venezuela, which called for the sanctions against Cuba in 1964 when it felt threatened by the

Cuban support of insurgents within its borders, has called for a reconsideration of the 1964 resolution. Other nations, such as Germany, Canada, Great Britain, Japan, Spain, and France, already enjoy the benefits of trade with the island nation. It is now time for the United States to abandon outdated hostilities and tensions and work for better relations among all nations.

CUBA MOVES TOWARD RECONCILIATION

The new Cuban attitude of acceptance of nonviolent social change is summarized in the recent Cuban-Soviet statement, signed by Castro and Soviet Communist Party chief Leonid Brezhnev on February 2, 1974, which states:

Cuba and the Soviet Union declare themselves in favor of the full validity of the principles of equality, respect for sovereignty and territorial integrity and the renouncing of the use of force and the threat of using it in relations among the nations of Latin America, as well as in the other nations of the world.

Other recent actions of the Cuban Government have indicated that a new responsiveness on the part of Castro to an improvement and possible resumption of relations with the United States. Castro has cut his prerequisites for talks from four to one. Previously he had demanded the following four points be met before any type of negotiations could be considered:

First. The withdrawal of the United States from the Guantanamo Naval Base;

Second. The cessation of what they considered to be subversive U.S. activities in Cuba and Latin America;

Third. The cessation of the role of the United States as hemispheric policeman; and

Fourth. The cessation of U.S. aggression in Vietnam.

Now, the only demand Castro makes—and it is not unreasonable—is that the embargo of Cuba be lifted before talks can be initiated.

Cuban foreign ministry officials have even expressed a "willingness to negotiate" their position concerning Guantanamo. Moreover, the U.S. volleyball team was invited to Cuba; a delegation from the U.S. Department of Commerce attended an oceanographic conference held in Cuba sponsored by the United Nations Intergovernmental Oceanographic Commission; the Cuban baseball team played in Puerto Rico for the pre-Olympian trials; and a Cuban delegation attended the International Sugar Conference in New Orleans in October 1971.

The reduction of demands and the informal thawing of relations indicates the increased receptiveness on the part of the Cuban Government toward reconciliation between the two nations.

SOVIET MILITARY AND ECONOMIC PRESENCE IN CUBA

As suggested earlier, United States and OAS policies of enforced isolation have contributed significantly to the Cuban military and economic dependency on the Soviet Union.

Militarily, the early attitude toward Cuba, as indicated by the Bay of Pigs disaster, gave the Cuban Government

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July 29, 1974

sufficient cause to seek military assistance for defense. The Soviet military forces on Cuba pose no significant threat to the national security interests of the United States. While the United States complains that the Soviet presence 90 miles from our shores allegedly poses a grave threat to our national security, we should not neglect the appreciable potential threat to Cuban security created by the United States military base on Cuban soil at Guantanamo. I believe that it would be possible to solve, through negotiations with the Soviet Union, legitimate objections to the maintenance of a Soviet military presence in Cuba, especially since the Soviet Union has indicated that it would welcome a warming of relations between Cuba and the United States. Until an improvement of relations occurs, it is difficult to imagine that the Cuban Government will forsake Soviet military aid it views as essential to Cuban security.

Economically, the Soviets are increasingly concerned with the inefficient use Castro makes of the substantial economic aid they provide. The Cubans have burdened the Soviet Union with an annual assistance tab of \$500 million. Rescinding the embargo would open international markets to Cuban products, thereby easing the Soviet burden of having to support the island economy and freeing the Cubans from exclusive dependency on Soviet subsidies.

UNSETTLED PROPERTY CLAIMS

One argument that has been traditionally used against lifting the embargo on trade with Cuba are the unsettled property claims which remain outstanding from the expropriations which followed the advent of the Castro regime. I do not think these unsettled property claims remain a significant obstacle to resumption of relations between Cuba and the United States. The larger losses sustained by American corporations were long ago written off as tax losses. What remains are principally relatively small, individual claims, in the range of \$20,000 to \$50,000. It seems to me that these claims can be negotiated to the satisfaction of all parties, as is evidenced by the agreements Cuba signed with France and Switzerland in 1967 for the settlement of compensation claims of those countries.

THE ARGENTINE SITUATION

Last year the Government of Argentina extended \$12 million in credits to Cuba. Included in this package agreement was a deal for 44,000 automotive vehicles produced by General Motors, Ford, and Chrysler subsidiaries in Argentina. The Argentine Government stipulated that if the Argentine subsidiaries of America's big three auto companies did not supply the vehicles, then those firms would lose access to the Argentine market. This pressure caused the State Department to make an "exception" to the trade embargo, allowing the \$156 million deal to go through.

In consequence, the president of the United Auto Workers Union, Leonard Woodcock, has deplored the consequences of the U.S. trade embargo, particularly upon auto workers. In a statement

printed by the New York Times, Woodcock said:

If American model cars are going to Cuba anyway, isn't it about time for our government to amend the embargo so that Cuba can buy motor vehicles produced in this country?

BENEFITS OF RESUMING RELATIONS WITH CUBA

The claim has been made that the United States would derive no benefits from improved relations with Cuba. The simplest response to this argument is that the current underlying policy toward Cuba has provided no benefits; and indeed has proven a costly failure. Our attempts to isolate Cuba and transform Castro's politics have served only to further alienate him and to strengthen support for his regime. This policy of isolation has become a source of increasing tension and divisiveness among our allies in the hemisphere. The potential benefits of renewed trade have been sacrificed to an ineffective and outdated foreign policy. We need a new and creative attitude toward relations with Cuba—an attitude to ease international tensions and promote international understanding.

Normalizing relations with Cuba would be entirely consistent with the "détente" strategy pursued by the Nixon administration with other Communist powers. What is more, the economic benefits of improved relations are obvious. Many of our closest allies have maintained trade with Cuba all along, ignoring U.S. attempts to isolate that nation from international commerce. In 1958 the United States exported \$546.9 million worth of goods to Cuba, importing \$527.8 million, for a net trade surplus of \$19 million. There is no reason to believe that the same kinds of economic advantages would not accrue to the United States in the course of improved relations and as a result of the repeal of the trade embargo.

The purpose of the amendment I intend to offer in the Foreign Affairs Committee is simple. It would repeal those existing provisions in the Foreign Assistance Act which constitute undesirable restraints upon normalizing relations with Cuba. The text of the proposed amendment follows:

AMENDMENT TO H.R. — OFFERED BY MR. HARRINGTON

Page 7, after line 7, insert the following new section:

ASSISTANCE TO CUBA

SEC. 10 (a) Section 301(b) of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 (22 U.S.C. 2221(b)) is amended by striking out the second sentence.

(b) Section 620 of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 (22 U.S.C. 2370) is amended—

(1) by inserting "military" before "assistance" the first and third times it occurs in paragraph (1) of subsection (a);

(2) by striking out the last sentence in paragraph (1) of subsection (a);

(3) by striking out paragraph (2) of subsection (a);

(4) by redesignating paragraph (3) of subsection (a) as paragraph (2) and by amending such paragraph to read as follows:

"(2) No funds authorized to be made available under this Act (except under section 214) shall be used to furnish assistance to any country which fails to take appropriate steps to prevent ships or aircraft under its registry from transporting to Cuba (other

than to United States installations in Cuba) any items which are, for the purposes of title I of the Mutual Defense Assistance Control Act of 1951, arms ammunition, implements of war, atomic energy materials, or items of primary strategic significance used in the production of arms, ammunition, or implements of war"; and

(5) by adding before the period in subsection (b) the following: "; except that only military assistance shall not be furnished to Cuba if the President determines that Cuba is dominated or controlled by the international Communist movement".

Renumber the following sections accordingly.

REQUEST FOR MODIFIED OPEN RULE FOR H.R. 16090, FEDERAL ELECTION CAMPAIGN ACT AMENDMENTS OF 1974

The SPEAKER pro tempore. Under a previous order of the House, the gentleman from Ohio (Mr. HAYS) is recognized for 5 minutes.

Mr. HAYS. Mr. Speaker, I wish to advise my Democratic colleagues in the House that the Committee on House Administration has ordered favorably reported H.R. 16090, the Federal Election Campaign Act Amendments of 1974 and that I have been authorized and directed by the committee to request a notified open rule for consideration of the bill on the floor of the House of Representatives. We will file our committee report on the bill no later than midnight Wednesday, July 30, which, of course, will make it available early Thursday morning. I am making this announcement particularly directed to my Democratic colleagues in order to comply with rule 17 of the Democratic Caucus.

Mr. Speaker, I intend to request a rule which would permit committee amendments and germane amendments regarding campaign expenditure limits, the composition of the Board of Supervisory Officers, definition of terms, public financing of Federal elections, and the consideration of bank loan endorers as contributors. I will also ask the Rules Committee to require that all amendments which Members may wish to offer to the bill be printed in the Record 24 hours prior to their being considered.

The SPEAKER pro tempore. Under a previous order of the House, the gentleman from Massachusetts (Mr. O'NEILL) is recognized for 5 minutes.

[Mr. O'NEILL addressed the House. His remarks will appear hereafter in the Extensions of Remarks.]

CAPTIVE NATIONS WEEK

The SPEAKER pro tempore. Under a previous order of the House, the gentleman from New York (Mr. STRATTON) is recognized for 5 minutes.

Mr. STRATTON. Mr. Speaker, 15 years ago I had the honor of joining with other Members of this body in approving legislation designating the third week of July as Captive Nations Week, a week in which we seek to remind ourselves of the fate of 100 million east and central